Abstract-Key management schemes are used to provide access control to data streams for legitimate users. The users often have certain partially ordered relations, while data streams also form some partially ordered relations. Previous key management schemes have failed to take into consideration of either the user relations or data stream relations. In this paper, we propose a centralized key management scheme for hierarchical access control that considers both partially ordered users and partially ordered data streams. Our scheme improves the efficiency of key management by encrypting multiple equivalent data streams with a single data encryption key, instead of encrypting each data stream with a unique data encryption key in the multi-group key management scheme [2]. We develop a simulation model to evaluate the performance of our proposed scheme. Simulation results show that our scheme reduces at least 20% of storage overhead at every user and rekey overhead compared to the multi-group key management scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Group communication provides a way for a user or a subgroup of users to send (or receive) data streams to (or from) other users. Many emerging Internet applications, such as teleconferencing, e-newspaper, and play-on-paid multicast services, are based on group communication. However, in order to widely commercialize these applications, the issue of access control must be addressed. Access control for group communication must ensure that the legitimate users are able to access the authorized data streams, while preventing the nonlegitimate users from gleaning any unauthorized data stream. Hence, a data encryption key is usually used to encrypt data streams, and a user is able to access the set of data streams only if he/she possesses the data encryption key that is used to encrypt the corresponding set of data streams.
In the group communication, when a user joins or leaves from a group, the data encryption key must be updated to ensure backward secrecy and forward secrecy [1] . Key management scheme aims to update and assign the data encryption key to the legitimate users so that only the legitimate users possess the data encryption key at any time. One important key management approach is centralized key management, which employs a centralized key server to update and assign the data encryption key to the legitimate users via rekey messages.
The efficiency of a centralized key management scheme is primarily measured by rekey overhead at the key server that is defined as the average number of rekey messages transmitted by the key server to users per key updating, the rekey overhead at users that is defined as the average number of rekey messages received by the users per key updating, and storage overhead that is defined as the average number of keys stored at the key server and the users [2] . Logical key graph is an important data structure to improve the efficiency of key management. Logical key graph is maintained at the key server and stores encryption keys at its nodes. When a user joins, the key server updates the nodes that contain the keys assigned to the user, and assigns the updated keys to the user. When a user leaves, the key server updates those nodes in the key graph that contain the compromised keys. Many schemes [3] , [4] , [5] have been proposed in order to construct and maintain a logical key graph. However, these schemes only provide key management for equivalent users and equivalent data streams, that is, all users in the group have the same access right to the same set of data streams. Access control for users having different access rights to multiple data streams widely exists in practice. For example, in e-newspaper broadcasting, there are multiple data streams to broadcast in the contents of top news, weather, financial news, stock, and sports news. The service provider also classifies users into four membership groups, i.e., gold, silver sports, silver finance, and basic. The access right of each membership group to those data streams is shown in Table I . More applications with this type of access control can be found in video broadcasting, financial banking systems, and military group communications. Generally, in these access control systems, the users form a partially ordered hierarchy and the data streams also form a partially ordered hierarchy. Hence, the access control schemes for partially ordered user hierarchy and data stream hierarchy are called hierarchical access control.
An intuitive key management scheme for hierarchical access control is that a data encryption key encrypts each data stream. For each data encryption key, the centralized key server constructs a logical key tree that is used to assign the data encryption key to the users that can access the corresponding data stream. By using this scheme, the key server must maintain multiple separate key trees, each of which is for a data stream, and a user that is able to access multiple data streams has to be in multiple logical key trees, which may lead to key management inefficiency.
Several key management schemes [2] , [6] have been proposed to construct a single logical key graph for the hierarchical access control in order to improve the efficiency of key management. In [6] , users are in different access levels, higher-level users can access more data streams than lower-level users. Each level is associated with a level key. A single unbalanced logical key tree is constructed, in which higher-level users are placed (b) on deeper branches of the logical key tree, such that higherlevel users possess all level keys at and below their security level. However, this scheme only provides key management for the cases that the users form linearly ordered relations, that is, the higher-level users are able to access data streams that the lower-level users can access.
A Multi-Group (MG) key management scheme considers that users form partially ordered relations while the data streams are not partially ordered [2] . In this scheme, each data stream i is encrypted by a data encryption key, dk i . Users that can access a data stream i form a data group (DG), and they shares the data encryption key dk i . Users that can access the same set of data streams form a service group (SG), and share a service group key, sk i . In order to construct a single logical key graph, the scheme initially constructs SG-subtree for every service group. Then, the scheme constructs a DG-subtree to construct key hierarchy for data encryption keys and SG-subtrees. The duplicated structures on the DG-subtrees are merged in order to improve the efficiency of key management. However, merging duplicated structures may become difficult when the users have complicated partially ordered relations. Moreover, in this scheme, the data streams are not partially ordered, that is, each data stream is encrypted by an individual data encryption key, which may lead to the key redundancy.
In the e-newspaper broadcasting example (Table I) , the MG key management scheme encrypts each data stream by a data encryption key, as shown in Fig. 1(a) . While, the top news and weather data streams can be accessed by the members in all four groups, and the financial news and stock data streams can be accessed by silver financial group only. Hence, we group top news and weather data streams, and group financial news and stock data streams, so that each data stream group shares the same data encryption key, which results in fewer data encryption keys, as shown in Fig. 1(b) . Hence, we need to consider not only user relations, but also data stream relations.
In this paper, we propose a hierarchical access control (HAC) key management scheme. The HAC key management scheme employs a centralized key server to maintain partially ordered relations of users and data streams, as well as a logical key graph. The logical key graph is constructed based on both user relations and data stream relations that are formalized in [7] . The HAC scheme can handle all kinds of practical user relations and data stream relations, and further improve the efficiency of key management, compared to the multi-group key management scheme in [2] . Although [8] have proposed a Chinese Reminder Theorem based hierarchical access control for secure group communication, this scheme is only suitable for users having tree-based partially ordered hierarchy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the algorithm to formalize the partially ordered relations of users and partially ordered relations of data streams in [7] , and we also describe some concepts on logical key graph. In Section III, we present an algorithm to construct a logical key graph. Section IV evaluates the performance of the HAC key management scheme. Section V concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we describe the algorithm to formalize the partially ordered relations of users and partially ordered relations of data streams in [7] . Then we describe some concepts about logical key graph.
A. Formalization of Partially Ordered Relations
U -a set of users {u 1 , u 2 , · · ·} R -a set of data streams {r 1 , r 2 , · · ·}, or overall resources A -an access relation, where A ⊆ U × R R(u i ) -a set of data streams that user u i can access U (r i ) -a set of users that can access data stream r i U i -a membership group that is a subset of users R i -a resource group that is a subset of data streams. Bases on the access relation A, the users have partially ordered relations that can be formalized as follows:
(2) The equivalent users u i and u j are grouped into the same membership group. If U i and U j are two different membership groups, then
Bases on the access relation A, the data streams also have partially ordered relations that can be formalized as follows:
(4) The equivalent data streams r i and r j are grouped into the same resource group. If R i and R j are two different resource groups,
The partially ordered relations of membership groups or the partially ordered relations of resource groups can be represented by a directed acyclic graph (DAG). In the DAG, a vertex represents a membership group or a resource group. We say that Vertex V j is adjacent to Vertex V i if (V j , V i ) is an edge in the DAG. Moreover, V i ≤ V j if and only if there exists a directed path from V j to V i , and we say that Vertex V j is reachable to Vertex V i . A vertex that has no incoming edges is called root.
Based on the access relation shown in Table I , we formalize the partially ordered relations of membership groups and the partially ordered relations of resource groups, as shown in Fig. 2(a) and (b) respectively. Unified relations of membership groups and resource groups defined in [7] are also formalized, and the unified DAG is shown in Fig. 3 . The unified relations compact the partially ordered relations of both membership groups and resource groups by merging membership groups and resource groups. 
B. Logical Key Graph
In a logical key graph, a k-node represents a key and a unode represents a user. There are two types of k-node, data encryption key and key encryption key (KEK). Key encryption key is used to encrypt the data encryption key and other KEKs in order to form the key hierarchy. Each user u stores a set of keys that is notated as Keyset(u), including its private key and the keys along the routes from itself to the root of the key graph. We also notate Userset(k) as the set of users that possess Key k, we say that Key k covers users in Userset(k).
The centralized key server constructs a logical key graph in order to efficiently update and assign data encryption keys for users dynamically joining /leaving. When a user joins the group, the key server chooses a leaf position for the user, increases the revision of all keys along the route from the new leaf to the root, and sends the revision of those keys to the new user. The keys with new revision number are updated from old key using a one-way function [9] . The key server needs to send only one rekey messages for a user joining that is used to inform the updated keys for the new user. When a user leaves from the group, the key server updates the keys possessed by the leaving user [3] , [9] . The number of rekey messages sent by the key server for a user leaving increases linearly with the logarithm of group size [3] . Users can decrypt the updated data encryption key with the updated KEKs possessed by the user.
Using the MG key management scheme, the logical key graph constructed for the access relation in Table I is shown in Fig. 4 .
III. HAC KEY GRAPH CONSTRUCTION
In this section, we describe an algorithm to construct a logical key graph based on the unified relations of membership groups and resource groups. The algorithm encrypts all data streams in a resource group with a single data encryption key, called resource-group key, which results in fewer data encryption keys than the MG key management scheme. In the al- gorithm, users in a membership group is constructed into a binary tree, called membership-group subtree. The root of a membership-group subtree is called membership-group key.
The algorithm then constructs a resource-group subgraph to connect membership-group subtree to the resource groups in order to ensure that the data encryption keys are assigned to the right membership groups. Figure 5 shows the key graph constructed by the HAC key management scheme based on the unified DAG in Fig. 3 . For each resource group R i , all data streams in R i are encrypted by a resource-group key, dk i . For each membership group U i , the users in U i construct a balanced binary tree, in which the root is mk i .
We now describe how to construct the resource-group subgraph. The algorithm explores the unified DAG in a breadthfirst search manner in order to obtain all membership groups that are reachable or equivalent to a resource group. Hence, for each resource group R i , the resource-group key dk i must cover all membership groups that are reachable or equivalent to R i in the unified DAG. In the process of exploring the unified We give an example to explain the cover operation when Vertex V 4 is covered black in Fig. 3 . Since Vertices V 1 , V 2 , and V 3 are reachable to Vertex V 4 , the cover operation for V 4 constructs a balanced binary tree in which the root covers the membership groups in V 1 , V 2 , V 3 , and V 4 . Since the representative k-node of Vertex V 2 that is adjacent to V 4 has already covered V 1 and V 2 , the cover operation reuses dk 1 in the construction of the binary tree, as shown in Fig. 5 . The root of the binary tree is the resource-group key for R 3 , dk 3 .
Note that reusing the representative k-nodes in the cover operation may result in redundancy of rekey and key storage, if multiple reused representative k-nodes cover the same membership group. For example, in the cover operation for Vertex V 4 , if the representative k-nodes dk 1 and dk 2 are reused in the same binary tree, the number of k-nodes along the route from U 1 to the root becomes higher, which leads to more storage overhead at the users and more rekey overhead. In order to avoid the redundancy, the cover operation for Vertex V i can construct a balanced binary tree for a set of k-nodes in which all k-nodes cover disjoint sets of membership groups and the number of k-nodes is minimum. We use a simple greedy algorithm to find the set of k-nodes for Vertex V i . Let the set of the membership groups that are in V i and in all vertices reachable to V i be M , a set of k-nodes that cover disjoint sets of membership groups be K, a set of membership groups that has been covered by the k-nodes in K be C, and the set of the uncovered membership groups in M be U . Initially, K = mk i , C = U i , and U = M − C. In each step, among all representative k-nodes of vertices adjacent to V i , the algorithm selects a representative k-node, say rk j , that covers most uncovered membership groups in U . For each selected rk j , the algorithm finds a k-node k that may be rk j or a descendent of rk j to cover (Userset(rk j ) − C), then removes Userset(k) from U , inserts the k-node k into K, and inserts Userset(k) into C. Figure 6 shows the algorithm to explore the unified DAG and construct the resource-group subgraph. The algorithm assumes that the input unified DAG is represented by a collection of lists Outgoing [V ] , where V is a vertex in the unified DAG. Each Outgoing[V ] contains the vertices connecting V by outgoing edges. The algorithm also maintains several additional 
IV. PERFORMANCE
In this section, we compare the performance of the HAC key management scheme with the MG key management scheme. The performances of both schemes are measured by the storage overhead at the key server and at every user, as well as the rekey overhead of key server and users. We develop a simulation model to construct logical key graph based on an access relation and to simulate user actions in the system. We simulate three access relations that are represented by the same unified DAG in Fig. 3 , but the number of data streams in the three resource groups R 1 , R 2 , and R 3 in each access relation is different, which is shown in Table II . Since in the HAC scheme, all data streams in a resource group is encrypted by the same resource group key, the logical key graphs for the three access relations are the same. However, by using the MG scheme, the logical key graphs for Access Relations I, II, and III have 3, 5, and 8 data encryptions keys respectively.
In each experiment, a sequence of user actions is generated, in which the ratio of the number of joining, leaving and switching actions is 1:1:1. For each joining, user uniformly selects a membership group to join. For each switching, a user is uniformly selected to switch from the user's current membership group to a membership group that is also uniformly selected. In the simulation, the initial number of users in each membership group is 16. The user actions are generated with Poisson distribution at rate 0.1. Hence, the number of users in the key graph changes over time up to 550 users in the simulation. Figure 7 plots the average storage overhead per user action verus the total number of user actions. Fig. 7(a) shows the average storage overhead at the key server. Since the difference of storage overhead at key server between the two schemes primarily depends on the number of data encryption keys stored in the key server, both schemes have the same storage overhead at key server for Access Relation I. The HAC scheme has 2 data encryption keys fewer than MG scheme for Access Relation II, and 5 data encryption keys fewer than the MG scheme for Access Relation III. Fig. 7(b) shows the average storage overhead at every user. We can see that both schemes have the same storage overhead at every user for Access Relation I. This is due to the number of data encryption keys in both schemes is three for Access Relation I. For Access Relations II and III, since the HAC scheme requires fewer data encryption keys, which results in less storage overhead at every user. Figure 8 plots the average number of rekey overhead for each leave or switch action verus total number of user actions. Fig. 8(a) shows the average rekey overhead at the key server. Fig. 8(b) shows the rekey overhead at the users. We observe that the HAC scheme has the same rekey overhead at the key server and the users as the MG scheme for Access Relation I. While, the HAC scheme results in less rekey overhead at the key server and the users than the MG scheme for Access Relation II and III. Figure 9 shows the percentage of overhead reduced by using the HAC scheme, compared to the MG scheme. We can see that the HAC scheme only reduces a little of storage overhead at the key server. This is because that the difference of storage overhead at the key server between the two schemes depends on the number of data encryption keys stored in the key server. However, the HAC scheme reduces at least 20% storage overhead at every user and rekey overhead of key server and users for Access Relation II, reduces more than 30% storage overhead at every user and rekey overhead of key server and users for Access Relation III, compared to the MG scheme. 
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a hierarchical access control key management scheme for group communication. We designed an algorithm to construct a key graph based on unified relations of membership groups and resource groups. In the key graph constructed by the hierarchical access control key management scheme, the data streams in a resource group are encrypted by a single data encryption key, which leads to fewer data encryption keys than the multi-group key management scheme. We compared the performance of the hierarchical access control key management scheme with the multi-group key management scheme by simulation. The simulation results showed that the hierarchical access control key management scheme is more efficient compared to the multi-group key management scheme.
